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BOOK REVIEW
PROTECTING OPEN SPACE: LAND USE CONTROL IN THE ADIRONDACK

PARK. Richard A. Lirof & G. Gordon Davis with a chapter by F Frank

Lyman. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company. 1981. Pp.
xiv, 302. $25.00.
INTRODUCTION

The exercise of government power to regulate the use of land in
order to achieve public benefits such as well-planned communities,
clean and orderly neighborhoods, and environmental quality is a critical
legal and policy issue for federal, state, and local governments. In Protecting Open Space: Land Use Control in the Adirondack Park,' Richard A.
Liroff, Senior Associate at the Conservation Foundation, 2 and G.
Gordon Davis, an attorney in Elizabethtown, New York, and former
General Counsel of the New York State Adirondack Park Agency, analyze the efforts of New York State to establish land use controls over the
six million acre Adirondack Park. Liroff and Davis have conducted a
detailed study of one of the most important and controversial regional
land use planning and control initiatives in the United States. Their
book is among the best treatments of the subject of land use regulation.
I
THE BROAD LEGAL CONTEXT

Protecting Open Space is a significant contribution to the already ex3
tensive literature on land use law and policy in the United States.
1 R.

LIROFF

&

G. DAVIS, PROTECTING OPEN SPACE: LAND USE CONTROL IN THE

ADIRONDACK PARK (1981).
2 The Conservation Foundation is a nonprofit organization, founded in 1948 and based
in Washington, D.C., that conducts research on issues in environmental and resource
management.
3 The number and types of sources discussing land use law and policy are quite diverse.
See, e.g., G. BARNEY, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: THE CrIzEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1977); J. BEUSCHER, R. WRIGHT & M. GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE (2d ed. 1976); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING

ISSUE (1973); F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUI T REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1972); L. CALDWELL, L. HAYES & J. MACWHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASE STUDIES IN POPULAR ACTION (1976); 9 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY ANN. REP. 220-68 (1978); D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1980); R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND
THE STATES (2d ed. 1979); J. HITE, ROOM AND SITUATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LAND-USE POLICY (1979); J. KUSLER, REGULATING SENSITIVE LANDS (1980); A. LEOPOLD,

A

SAND COUNTY ALMANAC

TROLS LEGISLATION

(1976);

(1966); D.

TROLS IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S.];

NATURAL

MANDELKER,

ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CON-

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, LAND USE CON-

(1977) [hereinafter cited as

RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, LAND

LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE

USE CONTROLS IN NEW YORK
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Since the beginning of this century, the exercise of governmental power
to regulate the use of privately owned land has spawned an extensive
legal history. 4 The landmark decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 5 and Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realy
Co., 6 among others, 7 foreshadowed innumerable judicial opinions at all
levels of government. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 8 and Agins v. City of Tburon,9 as
well as the opinions of state courts,10 indicate the likelihood of continued
judicial review of issues raised by government's exercise of land use control powers.
Many state and local governments, and in some circumstances, the
federal government are exercising their powers to regulate the use of
land in a variety of ways in order to achieve a broad spectrum of public
policies. For example, state-initiated land use control efforts in Florida, 1 Vermont, 12 California, 13 and Hawaii; 14 local and state government land use regulation in such diverse areas as farmland
preservation ' 5 and historic preservation;1 6 and federal government reguSTATE (1975); R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND USE REGULATION LAW (1977); F. POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND-

USE REFORM (1981); E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING (2d ed. 1975); C. STONE, SHOULD
TREES HAVE STANDING?: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (1974); TASK
FORCE ON LAND USE & URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A CrrIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE
TO URBAN GROWTH (1973); S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963); THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, I PRESERVING OUR NATURAL HERITAGE: FEDERAL ACTIVITIES (1976); THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, 2 PRESERVING OUR NATURAL HERITAGE: STATE ACTIVITIES (1977);
POLITICS OF LAND: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON LAND USE IN CALIFORNIA

(R. Fellmeth project dir. 1973); McClaughry, Farmers,Freedom, andFeudalism: How to Avoid the
Coming Serfdom, 21 S.D.L. REV. 486 (1976); Walker & Heiman, Quiet Revolutionfor Whom?, 71
ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 67 (1981). For useful major treatises on land use law, see
1-5 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (2d ed. 1976); 1-7 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS (1984); 1-5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND
THE POLICE POWER (1975).
4
See the materials collected in C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING (3d ed. 1976); D.
HAGMAN, supra note 3; E. ROBERTS, supra note 3.

5 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
6 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7 See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
8 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
10 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151,336 A.2d 713, appealdismissed,423 U.S. 808 (1975), and 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983);
Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). See generall LAND
USE CONTROLS IN THE U.S., supra note 3.
11 See R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 126-76.
12

Id. at 40-79.

'3

14

Id. at 80-125.
D. MANDELKER, supra note 3, at 269-323.

15

See E.

(1982).

ROBERTS, THE

LAW AND THE PRESERVATION

OF AGRICULTURAL LAND
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lation of land uses affecting wetlands17 provide convincing evidence of
the pervasive and dynamic nature of land use controls.18 These developments involve critical political, social, and economic issues as well as
legal questions.1 9
Two central issues dominate the debate on the exercise of government power over the use of land resources: First, which level of government (federal, state, or local) should have primary authority to manage
land use;20 and second, what limits exist on the authority of the government to regulate the uses of private land.2 1 Given the interest of government at all levels in making decisions about land resources and the
desires of landowners to use their land as they believe best, there has
been no easy resolution to these issues.
Since the early 1900s, when local governments began to enact zoning ordinances and other land use control mechanisms, 22 the issue of
16

See C. DUERKSEN, A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAw (1983); READ-

INGS IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION: WHY? WHAT? How? (N. Williams, E. Kellog & F. Gilbert eds. 1983).
17 See Myhrum, FederalProtectionof Wetlands Through Legal Process, 7 B.C. ENV'L AFF. L.
REV. 567 (1979).
18 Regarding the pervasiveness of land use controls, see generally D. MANDELKER, supra
note 3; SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, STATE LAND USE PROGRAMS:
SUMMARIES OF LAND USE REGULATIONS IN EIGHT STATES, and A 50-STATE SURVEY OF

STATE LAND USE CONTROLS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1974).
19 For excellent discussions of the social, political, economic and legal issues surrounding
land use questions, see R. HEALY &J. ROSENBERG, supranote 3, at 1-39, 211-47; F. POPPER,
supra note 3, at 92-206. See also LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE U.S., supra note 3, at 1 (1977).
20 See R. HEALY &J. ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 211-14; D. MANDELKER, supra note 3,
at 63-127. See generally MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975).
21 The classic work in this field is F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &J. BANTA, THE TAKING
ISSUE (1973).
22 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1922), the Supreme Court
stated:
It is said that the Village of Euclid is a mere suburb of the City of Cleveland; that the industrial development of that city has now reached and in
some degree extended into the village and, in the obvious course of things,
will soon absorb the entire area for industrial enterprises; that the effect of the
ordinance is to divert this natural development elsewhere with the consequent
loss of increased values to the owners of the lands within the village borders.
But the village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it
sees fit within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the State and
Federal Constitutions. Its governing authorities . . . have determined, not
that industrial development shall cease at its boundaries, but that the course
of such development shall proceed within definitely fixed lines. If it be a
proper exercise of the police power to relegate industrial establishments to
localities separated from residential sections, it is not easy to find a sufficient
reason for denying the power because the effect of its exercise is to divert an
industrial flow from the course which it would follow, to the injury of the
residential public if left alone, to another course where such injury will be
obviated. It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility ofcases where the
generalpublic interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.

Id. at 389-90 (emphasis added).
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which level of government should control the exercise of land use powers
has been actively debated. Initially the activity of many local governments occupied this field. The promulgation and widespread adoption
of the Standard Zoning and City Planning Enabling Acts in the 1920s
and the inactivity of state governments and the federal government reinforced local government dominance in the land use field. 23 During
the 1930s, however, the national level planning efforts by such entities as
the National Resources Planning Board focused new attention on this
issue. This focus in national planning did not change the existing domi24
nance of local governments in the land use planning and control field.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, interest in regional, state, and
national planning was revived, and many state governments asserted
their general police power authority to establish numerous types of land
use controls.2 5 In many instances, state-adopted controls were a reaction
to the inability or unwillingness of local governments to protect adequately such important land and environmental resources as beaches,
wetlands, or agricultural lands. In other cases, these state controls reflected state government dissatisfaction with how local governments
were dealing with proposals for certain major kinds of development such
as the siting of electric power plants. Some of these new land use control
programs vested all critical decisions in state government, while others
created various mechanisms through which state and local governments
would share power over land use decisions. 26 Whatever choices were
made, local governments almost always opposed these state government
initiatives because they perceived the state initiatives to mean a loss of
27
traditional power and prerogatives at the local level.
By the early 1970s, many people were eagerly discussing "a quiet
revolution" in which state governments were asserting much greater

23

Notable exceptions were the efforts of many so-called "regionalists" that foreshad-

owed the planning activity of the 1930s. See, e.g., L. MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES
(1938); H. ODUM & H. MOORE, AMERICAN REGIONALISM (1938); PLANNING THE FOURTH
MIGRATION: THE NEGLECTED VISION OF THE REGIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA (C. Sussman ed. 1976).
24 For a discussion of the National Resources Planning Board, see M. CLAWSON, NEW

DEAL PLANNING (1981); Merriam, The NRPB: A Chapterin American Planning Experience, 38
AM. POL. Sm. REV. 1075 (1944). See also the publications of the Board: NATIONAL RESOURCES BOARD, STATE PLANNING: A REVIEW OF AcTivrrES AND PROGRESS (1935); NA- TIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, OUR CITIES: THEIR ROLE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
(1937); NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, REGIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT (1935).
25
See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 3.
26 F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 3; see also MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CODE (1975).
27
See D. ERVIN, J. FITCH, K. GODWIN, W. SHEPARD & H. STEVENS, LAND USE CONTROL: EVALUATING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS 31-60 (1977); R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 122-55.
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control over land use decisions than they traditionally had exercised. 28
During this period there were also federal legislative initiatives to promote state government exercise of land use controls. 29 However, none of
the proposals attracted sufficient support to obtain congressional approval. Consequently, the primary authority to directly control land
30
use remains with state and local governments.
Today the forces that encouraged state governments and, with
much less success, the federal government to assert greater control over
land use decisions appear to be less powerful than a decade ago.
Whether there is a general negative reaction to removing land use decisions from the local level or whether the economic and energy crises
have diminished state and federal government interest in land use issues
is difficult to determine. It is clear, however, that there are new voices
from a broad political perspective reassessing the centralized-regionalist
'3
logic of the "quiet revolution." '
The second issue concerning the limits of government authority
over the use of private land has been even more controversial. Courts at
all levels have wrestled with the difficult question as to when government control of private property in a particular case becomes an unconstitutional "taking" of private property rights. In Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon,32 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes set forth a case by case weighing process to assess the effect of the government's controls on the rights
of an individual property owner.33 Although the legal literature is replete with discussions of the various tests for determining when in fact a
"taking" has occurred, 34 there are no precise rules for predicting when a
28 Bosselman and Callies helped popularize the notion that a revolution, albeit a quiet
one, was occuring in the land use control arena. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 3.
29 See, e.g., NationalLand Use Polig: Hearings on S 3351 Before the Subcomm. on Environment
and Land Resources of the Senate Comm on Interiorand Insular Afairs, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970);
and NationalLand Use Poliy: Hearingson S 632 andS 992 Before the Subcomm. on Environmentand
LandResources of the Senate Comm. on Interiorand InsularAjairs, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); NationalLand Use Planning: Hearingson HR. 4332 and relatedbills Before the Subcomm. on the Environment ofthe House Comm. on InteriorandInsular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For an analysis
of this effort from a leftist political perspective, see Plotkin, Poli Fragmentationand Capitalist
Reform: The Defeat of National Land-Use Poliy, 9 POL. & Soc'Y 409 (1980).
30 See LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE U.S., supra note 3, at 2-3, 252, 317.
31
See B. BOBO, No LAND IS AN ISLAND: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF LAND USE (1975); F. POPPER, supranote 3; Geisler, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use
ControlRevisited, in THE RURAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE ADVANCED SOCIETIES 489-526 (F. Buttel
& H. Newby eds. 1980); McClaughry, supra note 3; Walker & Heiman, supra note 3.
32 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
33

Id. at 413.

34 See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 3, at 105-38; see also Callies,
Land Use Controls: Of Enterprise Zones, Takings, Plans and Growth Controls, 14 URB. LAW. 781
(1982); Hagman, Compensable Regulation. A Way of Dealing with Wtpeouts From Land Use Controls?,54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 45 (1976); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the EthicalFoundationsof'yust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings,
Private Property and PublicRights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or DamagingBy
Police Power. The Search For Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).
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court will find a "taking" of property rights where government has ap35
plied controls to a landowner's property.
Recent decades have witnessed a significant change in judicial attitudes to land use controls. For many years courts looked harshly on
land use controls that seriously affected the ability of landowners to use
their property as they saw fit. By the early 1970s, however, parallel with
the assertion of greater control over land resources by state governments,
and during a period of renewed interest in the environment in general
and land resource protection in particular, the courts became far more
willing to uphold land controls that imposed tough standards for development of certain important land resources such as tidal and freshwater
wetlands, flood plains, agricultural lands, and historic buildings. 36 In
1978, the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City3 7 underscored the strong judicial support for land use
controls in order to achieve appropriate public goals even if such controls imposed significant burdens on landowners. 38 The opinion also
suggested the continued necessity for case by case determinations where
the constitutionality of particular land use control mechanisms is
39
challenged.
No land use control effort in the United States exemplifies these
two critical issues more clearly than New York State's efforts to protect
the Adirondack Park. By state statute4° New York State has created a
comprehensive land use scheme in the Adirondack Park. While the
state is to share power with local governments in major land use decisions, 4 1 the plan provides that the state government holds the "bottom
35 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the
Court stated:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court
has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee. . . [is] designed to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"
Amstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), this Court, quite simply, has
been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons. . . . Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a
particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to
pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstancers [in that] case." United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,
357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
438 U.S. at 123-24.
36 See generaly 1 P. ROHAN, supra note 3, §§ 1.04 & 1.05; 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 3,

§§ 17.01-19.07[2].
37
38
39
40
41

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id at 125-28.
Id. at 124.
Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. Exi-c. LAw §§ 801-20 (McKinney 1982).
N.Y. EXEc. LAw §§ 807-10 (McKinney 1982); R. LIROFF & G. DAvis, supra note 1, at
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line" of authority. 4 2 Furthermore, the land use controls that the state
has imposed on major portions of the private lands in the Park are, in
comparison to other land use controls in the United States, quite restrictive. 43 Local governments and Adirondack residents have strenuously
opposed these restrictions.44 Accordingly, the Liroff and Davis book
chronicles an important chapter in the development of land use controls
45
in the United States.

II
THE ADIRONDACKS--A BRIEF SKETCH

Liroff and Davis address both the nature of the Adirondack Park
and the regional land use planning and control framework that the state
has established. We will briefly describe the Park, its history, and the
land use law framework established there.
The six million acre Adirondack Park46 in northern New York is

one of the great natural resources of the eastern United States. Its vast
forests, hundreds of lakes, thousands of miles of free-flowing rivers and
streams, extensive wetlands, and abundant wildlife are valuable natural
37-39, 58-63, 113-21; Booth, Developing Institutionsfor Regional Land Use Planning and ControlThe Adirondack Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 645, 672-84 (1979).
42
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 809-10 (McKinney 1982).
43 Typical land use density controls are expressed in terms of numbers of acres per allowable building. Density controls ranging up to five acres for a single house are not uncommon, but they are considered restrictive. See P. ROHAN, supra note 3, § 42.03(2). In contrast,
more than 50% of the private lands in the Adirondack Park are included in the Resource
Management category under the Land Use and Development Plan. The density guideline
for Resource Management areas is 15 principal buildings per square mile, or approximately
43 acres per principal building. R. LIROFF & G. DAVIs, supra note 1, at 33. While these
density requirements are not directly transferable into minimum lot size requirements, they
clearly are quite restrictive. An additional 34% or so of the private lands in the Park are
included in the Rural Use category for which the density requirement is 75 principal buildings per square mile, or approximately 8.5 acres per principal building. Id. at 32-33. See also
id. at 72-73.
44
F. GRAHAM, THE ADIRONDACK PARK: A POLITICAL HISTORY 254-63 (1978); R.
LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 122-55.
45
The Liroff and Davis book joins a growing body of literature on the Adirondack Park
Agency and land use controls in the Adirondacks. See, e.g., F. GRAHAM, supra note 44; Heiman, An Evaluationof(State Land Use Planningand Development Control in the Adirondack, CORNELL
UNIV. WATER RESOURCES AND MARINE SCIENCES CENTER TECHNICAL Rep. No. 93, 1974;
Booth, The Adirondack Park Ageng Act: A Challenge in Regional Land Use Planning, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 612 (1975); Booth & Hullar, Has the Adirondack ParkAgency Made a Difference?,2
AMICUS J. 12 (1980); Davis, Land Use Control and Environmental Protection in the Adirondack,
N.Y.S.BJ. 189 (1975); Lewis, New York'r Adirondacks: Tug of War in the Wilderness, PLANNING,
Sept. 1976, at 9-15; Savage & Sierchio, The Adirondack Park Agenc Act: A Regional Land Use
Plan Confronts "The Taking Issue," 40 ALB. L. REV. 447 (1976); Sullivan, Adirondack Zoning: A
National Experiment in Land-use Control Faces Local Challenge, 1 EMPIRE ST. REP. 464 (1975);
Comment, The APA Act: Land Use Regulations and the Real Property Ta, 42 ALB. L. REV. 637
(1978); Comment, PreservingScenic Areas: The Adirondack Land Use Program,84 YALE LJ.1705
(1975).
46 ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, 1 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as COMPREHENSIVE REPORT].
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treasures in the nation's second most populous state. 47 The Park provides commercially important natural resources such as minerals, timber, water and water power. 48 Equally significant, the great open spaces
of the Adirondacks, which include more than one million acres of formally designated wilderness areas, 49 provide extensive recreational opportunities for the tens of millions of persons who live within a day's
drive of this area. 50
Established as a state park encompassing approximately 4,400
square miles in 1892, 5 1 the Adirondack Park today consists of both public and private lands that cover about 9,000 square miles. The Park is
approximately the same size as Vermont and "one million acres larger
than Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, Glacier, and Olympic national parks combined. '52 The state owns approximately forty percent,
or 2.3 million acres, of the Park. 53 Virtually all of these state-owned
lands are part of the State Forest Preserve and protected as "Forever
Wild" lands by the New York State Constitution. 54 The Park's stateowned lands are intermingled with the sixty percent of the Park (3.7
million acres) owned by private' individuals, educational institutions,
group camps, corporations, and Adirondack local governments. 55
The 112,000 permanent residents of the Park, as well as the much
larger seasonal and transient populations, use the Park's nonstate lands
47

1977

ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY ANN. REP.

7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977 AN-

NUAL REPORT]; ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, THE ADIRONDACK PARK 2 (1977).

48

See generall TEMPORARY STUDY COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ADIRON(1970) [hereinafer cited as THE FUTURE

DACKS, THE FUTURE OF THE ADIRONDACK PARK

OF THE ADIRONDACK PARK]; and TEMPORARY STUDY COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF

THE ADIRONDACKS, 1-7 TECHNICAL REPORT (1970).
49

ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, ADIRONDACK PARK STATE LAND MASTER PLAN 23

(1979) [hereinafter cited as MASTER PLAN]. New York's system of designated wilderness areas comprises a significant percentage of all designated wilderness in the eastern United
States. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, NATIONAL WILDERNESS
PRESERVATION SYSTEM AND PRINCIPAL LANDS ADMINISTERED OR HELD IN TRUST BY FED-

ERAL AGENCIES (1978 map).
50 R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 2-5.

51 Act of May 20, 1892, ch. 707, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1459. For an indication of the original
size of the Park, see N. Van Valkenburgh, The Adirondack Forest Preserve: A Chronology
302 (1968) (unpublished transcript, Bureau of Land Acquisition, New York State Department of Conservation). The Park did not originally include private lands, but the Park's
boundary encompassed private lands. In 1912 the statutory definition of the Park was
changed to include state and nonstate lands. Id
52 R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 1.
53 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 1.
54 N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. Section I states in part:
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands.
They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation,
public or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.
That language has been in the State Constitution since 1895. It applies to Forest Preserve
lands in the Adirondack and Catskill regions. See MASTER PLAN, supra note 49, at 10.
55

TEMPORARY STUDY COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ADIRONDACKS, PRIVATE

AND PUBLIC LANDS, TECHNICAL REPORT 1, VOL. A, at 44-61 (1970).
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for a wide spectrum of activities. 56 Land uses range from private homes,
churches, schools, and commercial activities in the area's small villages
and hamlets57 to vast private estates 58 and large timber 59 and mining

operations. 60 Although the Park's economy depends heavily on tourism,
other significant economic activities including forestry, mining, government service, and agriculture also are important. 6 1 Nevertheless, the
economic situation for many of the Park's residents is bleak. Extremely
high rates of unemployment regularly occur, particularly during the
winter months, because most of the Park's tourist industry is oriented
62
toward summer activities.
In the late 1960s the Adirondack area came into the national and
state limelight. In 1967, Laurance Rockefeller privately funded a study
63
that recommended the creation of a 1.7 million acre national park.
The proposal met with nearly unanimous disfavor 64 and prompted New
York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Laurance's brother, to appoint
The Temporary Study Commission on the Future of the Adirondacks.
Their multivolume final report, issued in 1970, contained 181 recommendations. 65 Among the most important was the recommendation to
create the Adirondack Park Agency, an independent planning and regulatory organization to provide integrated land management in the
66
Park.
In 1971 the New York Legislature passed the Adirondack Park
Agency Act. 67 That legislation created the Adirondack Park Agency

(APA), a state executive agency that now consists of eleven members,
eight private citizens appointed by the governor and three state officials. 68 The Agency prepared a comprehensive plan for the state lands
56
57

1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 7.
TRANCIK, HAMLETS OF THE ADIRONDACKS: HISTORY, PRESERVA-

See generaly R.

TION AND INVESTMENT (1983).
58
See W. WHITE, ADIRONDACK COUNTRY 140-52 (1954).
59

R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 14-15; TEMPORARY STUDY COMMISSION ON

THE FUTURE OF THE ADIRONDACK, FORESTS, MINERALS, WATER AND AIR, TECHNICAL
REPORT 3, at 5-36 [hereinafter cited as TECHNICAL REPORT ON FORESTS, MINERALS,
WATER AND AIR].
60
TECHNICAL REPORT ON FORESTS, MINERALS, WATER AND AIR, supranote 59, at 37-

58.
61

See generally ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, ADIRONDACK PARK ECONOMIC PROFILE,

PHASE ONE (1976); COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 1-2.
62
See general~ ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, ADIRONDACK PARK ECONOMIC PROFILE,
PHASE ONE (1976); see also TEMPORARY STUDY COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ADIRONDACKS, TRANSPORTATION AND THE ECONOMY, TECHNICAL REPORT 4, at 24-25 (1970).
63
R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 10, 16-18.
64
65
66

67
68

F. GRAHAM, supra note 44, at 219-29.
See THE FUTURE OF THE ADIRONDACK PARK, supra note 48, at 9-24.
Id at 25-32.
Adirondack Park Agency Act, ch. 706, 1971 N.Y. Laws 1853.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 803 (McKinney 1982). The original Agency had only nine mem-

bers. Adirondack Park Agency Act, ch. 706, § 803, 1971 N.Y. Laws 1853, 1855.
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in the Park 69 and a land use and development plan for the Park's pri70
vate and other nonstate lands.
The Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan became effective
when signed by Governor Rockefeller in July 1972. 7 1 The Plan divides
state lands into nine classifications, ranging from intensive use to wilder72
ness areas, and establishes guidelines for their use and management.
The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation exercises responsibility over most of these state lands, including the Park's
73
constitutionally protected Forest Preserve.
In 1973 the State Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, a
land use plan for nonstate lands within the Park.74 Incorporated into the
Adirondack Park Agency Act, 75 the Land Use and Development Plan
for, nonstate lands took effect on August 1, 1973.76 The APA developed
the plan from an ecological approach to planning similar to the methods
77
that Ian McHarg popularized.
The regulatory structure for the Park's nonstate lands is intended to
be environmentally oriented and. yet sensitive to economic and social
concerns. 78 By any measurement the controls that it establishes are restrictive. By text 79 and map 80 it divides the Park's nonstate lands into
six land use classifications. These range from hamlets in settled areas to
resource management areas8 in the Park's vast "outback." Furthermore, it defines compatible uses for those areas. The Act sets density
guidelines 82 and shoreline restrictions. 83 The density guidelines are the
69
70

See Adirondack Park Agency Act, ch. 706, § 807, 1971 N.Y. Laws 1853, 1859.
See Id § 805, 1971 N.Y. Laws 1853, 1856.
71
MASTER PLAN, supra note 49, at 9.
72
The original State Land Master Plan designated only seven land use areas: Wilderness, Primitive, Canoe, Wild Forest, Wild Scenic and Recreational Rivers, Intensive Use, and

Travel Corridors.

ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, ADIRONDACK PARK STATE LAND MASTER

PLAN (1972). In 1979 New York State Governor Hugh Carey signed amendments to that
plan that created two new state land classifications: Historic and State Administrative.
73 MASTER PLAN, supra note 49, at 9 (1979).
74
Act of May 22, 1973, ch. 348, 1973 N.Y. Laws 1222.
75 Id. § I.
76 Id. § 13.
77
R. LIROFF & G. DAvIs, supra note 1, at 28; see I. MCHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE
(1969).
78
The balancing of environmental, social and economic factors is most evident in the
general statement of purpose of the APA Act, in the description of land use areas for nonstate
lands, and in the criteria that the Act establishes for approval of regional projects in the Park.
See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 801, 805, 809(10) (McKinney 1982).
79
Id. § 805(3).

80

Id

§ 805(2).

81 Id § 805(3). The six land use areas located on nonstate lands are hamlets, moderate
intensity use areas, low intensity use areas, rural use areas, resource management areas, and
industrial use areas.
82
The overall density guidelines are established as follows:
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Act's most restrictive and consequently most controversial aspect. 8 4 The

statute requires a permit from the APA before the undertaking of any
regional project, as defined in the Act.8 5 The scheme essentially attempts to protect the character of the Park by focusing development
activities either in already developed areas or in areas where resources
can best sustain additional development; conversely, it attempts to discourage intensive land use activities in less suitable areas. 86 Local governments may assume elements of the Agency's jurisdiction over project
87
reviews if they adopt local land use controls approved by the Agency.
The APA provides technical assistance to local governments to assist in
the preparation of local plans and ordinances. 88
In addition to its responsibilities under the APA Act, the Agency
also administers within the Park New York's Freshwater Wetlands Act 9
and major parts of the state's Wild, Scenic, and Recreational Rivers
System Act. 90 Accordingly, the whole land use structure is rather complex. 9 1 Both that structure and the APA itself have been highly controversial within the Park9 2 but, in contrast, generally quite popular
outside the Park.93 The extraordinary resources of the Park,94 the strong
a) hamlet areas:
b) hamlet use areas:

no guidelines
500 principal buildings per square mile (or
approximately 1.3 acres per building)
c) low intensity use areas:
200 principal buildings per square mile (or
approximately 3.2 acres per building)
d) rural use areas:
75 principal buildings per square mile (or approximately
8.5 acres per building)
e) resource management areas: 15 principal buildings per square mile (or approximately
43 acres per building)
f) industrial use areas:
no guidelines
R. LIROIF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 32-33; see also N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 805(3) (McKinney
1982).
83 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 806 (McKinney 1982).
84 See generally R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 126-29.
85 N.Y. EXEC. LAWV
§§ 809, 810 (McKinney 1982).
86 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, sunlra note 46, at 16-17; telephone interview with George
Davis, former Assistant Director of the APA (May 17, 1983). Davis, the primary staff architect of the Land Use and Development Plan, is currently Executive Director of the
Adirondack Council, a private environmental organization.
87 N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 807, 808 (McKinney 1982).
88
R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 58-63; COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note
46, at 36.
89 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 24-0801 to -0805 (McKinney 1984).
90 Id. §§ 15-2701 to -2723.
91 See Booth, supra note 41, at 696-99. To some extent the complexity that arises from
the Agency's implementation of all or parts of three major land use statutes, and from the
Agency's interrelationships with the New York State Departments of Health and Environmental Conservation, constitutes a liability.
92
R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 116-18, 122-55; F. GRAHAM, supra note 44, at
254-74.
93
R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 1, 29-30, 133, 149-53. Statewide environmental groups typically identify the protection of the Adirondack Park as among their highest
environmental priorities. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING LOBBY, ENVIRONMENTAL

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:361

land use control program created, 95 and the tension between in-Park
and out-of-Park political forces 96 make the Liroff and Davis book an
interesting and highly informative study of the nature of land use planning control programs.
III
THE AUTHORS' EFFORTS

Liroff and Davis discuss in detail and with great insight many of
the salient issues necessary to understand and assess land use planning
and control of nonstate lands in the Adirondacks. The authors explore
the conditions that prompted formation of the Agency as well as the
Land Use and Development Plan for the Park's nonstate lands; the process by which legislation is transformed into an administrative program-including the critical role that the leadership in the state capital
and within the Agency played; the environmental impact of the
Agency's regulatory program; the relationship of the Agency to local
planning; the politics of the Agency's planning and implementation efforts; and a legal analysis, authored separately by F. Frank Lyman, of
the approach used in the APA Act. The authors conclude by discussing
the lessons that the Adirondack experience provides for other land use
planning and control efforts.
The authors' approach is admirably multi-disciplinary. They have
accumulated a wealth of substantive data from numerous sources.
Their study encompasses historical research, numerous interviews, a
mail survey to local Adirondack legislators, an economic analysis of land
market impacts, a set of project review case studies, an examination of
agency files, and the use of selected consulting experts for the environmental and legal analyses. 97 Many of these resources are available to
the reader in the book's copious footnotes; among the information included in the appendices is a reprint of the Adirondack Park Agency
Act.
Liroff and Davis explain much about the history and socio-economic conditions of the Adirondacks. It is not, however, the authors'
intention merely to describe the area, the Plan, or the Agency, but also
to assess the effectiveness of the Agency and the Plan in planning and
(1981); Adirondack Council, Special Report: State of the Park-1982, Newsletter, Nov. 1982 [hereinafter cited as Council Newsletter].
94
See generaly W. WHITE, supra note 58.
95
Those land use controls have some important weaknesses. See Booth, supra note 41, at
691-701 (discussing APA's inability to fulfill its long-range planning responsibilities, and difficulties of sharing administrative authority with other state agencies); Booth & Hullar, supra
note 45, at 16 (citing such weaknesses as inadequate control of development around lakes and
ponds, limited enforcement capability, and lack of attention to long range park planning).
96 See F. GRAHAM, supra note 44, at 275-78.
97
For a discussion of the authors' research methods, see R. LIROFF & G. DAVIs, supra
note 1, at 12-13.
VOTER'S GUIDE
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regulation. Thus, to this assessment, the authors direct the bulk of the
data and analysis. They use the four substantive concepts of law, environment, administration, and politics as a framework for analysis. We
treat each of these subjects briefly below.
Frank Lyman, the author of the legal analysis chapter, sees the
Adirondack Park Agency Act as "one of the most ambitious undertakings in land use planning and control ever attempted in the United
States."98 His analysis addresses four constitutional issues, primarily
with regard to important legal decisions made under the statute. The
first of those issues is the state's authority to pass the statute. In analyzing that authority, Lyman discusses home rule issues, the power of the
state legislature to delegate authority to an administrative body, and the
limitations on the proper exercise of the state's police power. 99 The
other major issues that Lyman reviews are the taking issue, 0 0 equal protection considerations (a very brief section), 1 1 and procedural due process issues.

10 2

It was inevitable that there would be a challenge to the APA Act
concerning its legitimacy in light of the home rule provisions of the State
Constitution.10 3 In 1977 in Wambat Realo Corp. v. State,10 4 the New York
State Court of Appeals considered whether the Act violated those home
rule provisions. The case arose as a result of Wambat Realty's proposal
to build a very large second house development in the northeastern portion of the Adirondacks.I0 5 In a unanimous opinion that is replete with
very strong language supporting the APA Act, the court held that the
APA Act relates to matters "other than the property, affairs or government of a local government" and thus is authorized by powers that the
home rule article expressly reserves to the state.' 0 6 The opinion, considered the leading decision under the Act, characterized the ecological
considerations served by the Act as a "supervening State concern tran07
scending local interests."'
As Lyman points out, New York State has successfully defended the
APA Act against other challenges that the state did not have the authority it asserted in that statute. 0 8 The courts have supported the state's
98

99
100
101
102
103
104

Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

156.
157-65.
166-70.
170-71.
Id. at 171-74.

For the New York home rule provisions, see N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-3.
41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977); see also the companion case
to Wambal, Town of Black Brook v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 486, 362 N.E.2d 579, 393 N.Y.S.2d 946
(1977) (town has standing to challenge constitutionality of APA Act only because claim based
on home rule provision of New York State Constitution).
105 For a discussion of this case, see R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 157-60.
106 41 N.Y.2d at 497, 362 N.E.2d at 586, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
107 Id. at 495, 362 N.E.2d at 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
108 R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 160-65.
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position against claims that the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated
too much power to the APA.' 0 9 The state has also successfully defeated
claims that the APA Act exceeded the proper bounds of the police
power and violated citizens' rights to substantive due process."10
The state's position as to the three other main issues discussed by
Lyman (taking, equal protection, and procedural due process) seems
quite strong. There has been no definitive answer to the taking issue in
the Adirondack context. The 1976 New York State Court of Claims
decision in Horizon Adirondack Corp. v. State' suggests, however, that the
courts are likely to support the state in the face of most of these
claims."12 Lyman offers only a general discussion of equal protection
issues, focusing on whether the Act can legitimately discriminate between property owners inside and outside the Adirondack Park."l3 The
case of T
v. Adirondack Park Agenc 1 4 serves as the focus of the procedural due process analysis. In Tyler, the petitioner argued successfully
that the Agency could not deny his requested variance to the Act's
shoreline restrictions without holding a public hearing. Although Tyler
underscores the need for the Agency to afford procedural due process to
persons affected by its decisions, Lyman does not believe that the decision presents any threat to the basic legal structure that New York has
5
established in the Adirondacks."I
Lyman
whether the
constitution
open, in the

is careful to point out that "[w]ith the exception of...
APA Act violates the home rule provisions of New York's
(it does not), allthe issues discussed [in this analysis] remain
sense that they have not been passed upon by the courts of

109 See Adirondack Park Agency v. Ton-Da-Lay Assocs., 61 A.D.2d 107, 401 N.Y.S.2d
903 (standards of APA Act not so vague and indefinite as to constitute an unconstitutional
delegation of powers by the legislature because accompanied by statement of findings and
purposes), appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 834, 381 N.E.2d 612, 409 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1978); see also
McCormick v. Lawrence, 54 A.D.2d 123, 387 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1976) (because legislature set
standards sufficient to guide APA, delegation of power to agency to impose conditions in
granting permit constitutional), appeal dismissed, 41 N.Y.2d 900, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1977).
110 See, e.g., Adirondack Park Agency v. Ton-Da-Lay Assocs., 61 A.D.2d at 110-11, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 905 (APA Act not "constitutionally beyond the powers of the Legislature"); McCormick v. Lawrence, 54 A.D.2d at 125, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (holding that aesthetic preservation of area permissible exercise of police power).
111 88 Misc. 2d 619, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1976).
112 R. LIROFF & G. DAVIs, supra note 1, at 166-70. Lyman also discusses Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), as lending strong support to the
position of New York State on "taking" questions in the Adirondacks. Lyman points with
some caution, however, to the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Penn Centralas suggesting directions that the Supreme Court might eventually pursue. R. LIROFF & G. DAvIs,
supra note 1, at 166-68.
113 R. LIROFF & G. DAVIs, supra note 1, at 170-71.
1'4 86 Misc. 2d 818, 382 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), afd, 58 A.D.2d 718, 396
N.Y.S.2d 285 (1977); see also In reTyler v. Adirondack Park Agency, 92 Misc. 2d 754, 757, 402
N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (noting, in dictum, "[t]he appearance. . . of a pattern of bureaucratic harassment and uneven administration of the law" as to Tyler).
115 R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 175.
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highest jurisdiction." '" 6 Nevertheless, the record of the APA Act to date
in court suggests that New York's legal structure for land use planning
and control in the Adirondack Park is sound. The legal chapter clearly
supports Lyman's conclusion that "[w]ithout a most remarkable turn-7
about in the law, the APA Act will enjoy a long and robust legal life.""11
Liroff and Davis have more difficulty assessing the environmental
impact of the Agency's regulatory program under the Land Use and
Development Plan than Lyman had assessing the legal issues. The authors consulted a planner-architect-landscape architect to evaluate the
APA Plan map. The expert found problems of accuracy and consistency, an absence of documentation, and a high degree of subjectivity
that together may raise doubts about defending the Plan's ecological basis. 1 8 A quantitative analysis of the APA's project reviews highlights
some important facts. A full 58% of these reviews were for small
projects, that is, single-family dwellings or two-lot subdivisions.' 1 9
Fewer than one percent were for large subdivisions, a major raison d'eire
of the Agency.' 20 To the authors the figures suggest that "the agency
devotes an unduly high percentage of time and effort"' 12 1 to very small
projects, for which their review "may not be more sophisticated than
what one might expect from a local government employing technical
expertise available from a well-staffed county office."' 122 An in-depth
review of six project cases indicates that for the APA, as with many
other regulatory agencies, "[t]he technical bases for decisions are sufficiently malleable in some instances as to allow outcomes responsive to
23
political concerns."'
Perhaps because the legal issues are relatively clear and the environmental issues subject to political interests, the most useful portions of
the Liroff and Davis analysis concentrate on administrative and political
aspects. With regard to administration they note factors that reinforce
other analyses. Because it is the governor who selects the members of
the Agency, the governor's predilections are crucial to the Agency's success, activism, and support. 24 The chairman of the Agency, also selected by the governor, is an important, though not omnipotent, figure
with regard to the Agency's style, focus, and priorities.' 25 Finally, some
of the antagonism that the Agency encountered at the outset in the Adirondacks appears attributable to its hiring a highly dedicated but rela116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

124
125

d. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at

174 (emphasis in original).
175.
68-73.
75.
74-83, 112.

78.

83.
112.
43, 155.
11, 43-44, 143.
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tively young, inexperienced staff who were "apparently perceived by
many indignant Adirondackers as having come from the outside with
the belief that they were bringing environmental religion to the
126
heathens."
New York's choice to retain strong central authority over land use
in a state agency reflects the Temporary Study Commission's initial perceptions concerning local government capacity and ability.1 27 That
choice fed (and feeds) political opposition at the local level 128 and
among certain state legislators. 29 Given the Agency's interest in pursuing regional environmental quality goals, opponents in the Adirondacks
perceive the Agency as insensitive to the economic impact of regulation, 130 including the differential impact of its regulatory program on
private property rights.131 The APA's initial strict interpretations of the
APA Act and the environmental protection oriented enthusiasm of the
staff prompted this perception. Although the survey conducted for the
study showed "local officials' support for the basic premises of the APA's
plan [to be] quite limited,"' 132 the Agency has remained politically
strong because of the gubernatorial power and support, the relative lack
of importance of these issues for most state legislators, and the very firm
support the APA has throughout the rest of the state.133
Overall, the story that emerges in the authors' view is that of a well
intentioned effort, conducted for a good cause, but which has had some
major shortcomings in the area of implementation. The authors are also
quite sensitive to the issue of the roads not taken, the alternative options
that were available to the Agency. In particular, they believe that there
was the possibility of local government participation and coalitionbuilding with sympathetic local interests, but that this became difficult,
34
if not at times impossible, because of the Agency's apparent attitudes. 1
The authors' conclusions about the lessons of the Adirondack experience
recognize the changed political macro-climate: "[W]hat was appropriate and politically possible for the Adirondacks in the early 1970s may
13 5
be neither possible nor appropriate for other areas in the 1980s."'
They see that the Agency's strength derived from certain unique cir126
127
128
129

Id at 53.
Id. at 21, 177-78.
Id. at 22-30, 116-19, 177-80.
Id. at 153-54.
Id.at 128, 147-49.
130
Id. at 116-21. Material on the subject of differential impact is still rare in the environ131
mental and land use control field. For an indication of the disproportionate impact of regulatory policy, see Castle, PropertyRights and the PoliticalEconomy of Resource Scarcity, 60 J. AGRIC.
EcoN. 1 (1978); D. ERVIN, J. FITCH, K. GODWIN, W. SHEPARD & H. STEVENS, supranote 27,
at 24-30.
132
R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 115.
133 Id at 122-55, 177.
Id at 178-84; F. POPPER, supra note 3, at 144-48.
134
135
R. LIROFF & G. DAVIs, supra note 1, at 180.
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cumstances, including a financial and institutional independence from
local government, which also contributed to its political-administrative
problems.136 As for the future, it is within the areas of nonregulatory
land policy, easement acquisition, preferential tax assessment, and increased dialogue between the Agency's protagonists and opponents that
the authors see opportunities to ameliorate local grievances and estab37
lish a more useful role for the Agency.'
The Liroff and Davis book is not without its weaknesses. Three
obvious weaknesses are particularly significant: the lack of focus on issues arising from the state's management of state lands in the Park; the
lack of detail respecting the economic impacts of the APA Act on the
area; and the failure to examine the future of the Adirondack Park in
any detail.
Ironically, the book's strength is also its greatest weakness. By
choosing to concentrate their analysis on the Land Use and Development Plan for nonstate lands, i.e., private and municipal lands, the authors have ignored the single most important landowner in the area, the
State of New York. As noted, the state owns fully forty percent of the
Adirondack Park. Thus, its land use or nonuse decisions have important
implications for the environmental quality and economy of the region.
The existence of more than two million acres of state lands in the Park
was one of the major reasons New York State decided that it must create
138
a comprehensive land use control framework for the Adirondacks.
There are, in addition, important questions regarding the actual impact
of the State Land Master Plan on the state's management of its own
lands and the Agency's ability to serve as the key policy entity for overseeing integrated land management for all of the state and nonstate
139
lands in the region.
The APA has inevitably confronted numerous controversies in its
efforts to implement a strong, reasonably comprehensive land use plan
in the Adirondacks. As the authors note, much of that controversy has
arisen from the widespread perception among Adirondack residents that
the APA Act negatively affects the economic well-being of a region already beset by economic problems. 140 The authors discuss in detail a
number of the disputes in which the APA has become embroiled, from
the significant' 4 ' to the petty. 142 They fail, however, to discuss in any
detail the impact to date of the APA Act on the Adirondack economy or

137

Id at 176-80.
Id at 182-85.

138

COMPREHENSIvE REPORT, supra note 46, at 9-12.

139

Booth, sufra note 41, at 695-96; 1982 ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY ANN. REP. 5

136

(1983).
140
141

142

R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 122-23, 147-49.
Id. at 93-98, 107-12.
Id. at 104-07, 139-40.
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its potential economic impact in the future, impacts that have serious
policy implications. Supporters of the APA Act understandably argue
that the impact of the Act is, and will continue to be, significantly positive for the area's economic mainstays, tourism and the forest products
industry. 143 In part the authors fail to provide an adequate evaluation
because there is not a great deal of information yet available on the
economic impact of the APA Act.'4 Nevertheless, they do not try to
assess in any detail the information that does exist or examine what
types of indicators would be useful in order to make valid assessments of
the Act's economic impact.' 4 5 As a result, they leave the reader with
little more than the knowledge that local residents believe that the APA
Act has hurt them economically.
Finally, the authors devote little time to examining the future of the
Adirondacks and assessing how the land use structure imposed will help
the state to deal with problems that the Park will face. Those problems
will be many and varied. They will include, for example, a determination whether to retain the basic legal structure embodied in article XIV
of the State Constitution and the APA Act,' 46 strategies for dealing with
the impact of acid rain, t4 7 the cumulative impact of development on the
Adirondacks, 148 and the establishment of a more viable balance between
the goals of environmental protection and economic development. 149
Liroff and Davis accurately conclude that those supporting and opposing the structure that the APA embodies should engage in a more cooperative dialogue, and that, in the name of social equity, alternatives to
strict regulation should be explored.' 5 0 These two suggestions alone are
far from sufficient in determining the future role of the APA in land use
control. Given the authors' skills and insights they could have done
much more to help identify and assess the goals that future decisions
about the Adirondacks might pursue. 15'
These reservations about the Liroff and Davis book do not alter our
143

See Council Newsletter, supra note 93, at 3-4..

144 R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 147-49. For one of the few studies in this area,
see C. ZINSER, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ADIRONDACK PARK LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1980).
145 Some important new information on the economic impact of the Adirondack Park

program may result from a project entitled "Social and Economic Research" currently being
conducted by the College of Agricultural Life Sciences at Cornell University.
146 For a number of years, various proposals have surfaced in the state legislature to
amend the Forever Wild clause of article XIV of the State Constitution. See ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING LOBBY, NEW YORK ENVIRONMENTAL VOTER'S GUIDE (1981 & 1982); Council Newsletter, supra note 93, at 1.
147 Acid rain commands ever-increasing attention. See, e.g., P. WELLER & THE WATERLOO PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, ACID RAIN-THE SILENT CRISIS (1980); Boyle &
Boyle, AcdRain, AMICUS J., Winter 1983, at 22.
148
Booth & Hullar, supra note 45, at 20.
149

THE FUTURE OF THE ADIRONDACK PARK, supra note 48, at 67-70.

150

R. LIROFF & G. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 184-85.
Frank GrahamJr., in his study of the Adirondacks, reflected on these future concerns:

151
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very positive reaction to Protecting Open Space. Land use regulation in the
Adirondacks is an important topic. The authors have contributed a
very valuable and readable work to the growing literature on this land
use experiment. Land use efforts around the country would benefit by
having works of equal quality prepared on them.
SUMMARY

The Adirondack Park Agency Act represents a major step in the
land use planning and control field in the United States. Its successes
and failures, its strengths and weaknesses can provide valuable information for other efforts. Liroff and Davis have done much to make understandable the nature and significance of this complicated history and
complex framework. Their book is well worth attention.
RichardS Booth*
and Harvey M Jacobs*

In An Inquiy into the Human Prospect,Robert L. Heilbroner concludes that
"whether we are unable to sustain growth or unable to tolerate it, there can
be no doubt that a radically different future beckons."
In the face of such prospects it is fruitless to predict with any confidence
the shape of things to come in the Adirondacks. Some future energy crisis
may force the federal government to take an "easement" in the Forest Preserve and harvest wood for fuel or materials, just as it did on a restricted scale
to extract titanium during World War II. New pressures from an increasing
population or changing values may undo the most carefully planned regulations to preserve open space on private lands. In the years ahead we may find
ourselves squirreling away tracts of wilderness as early monks hid illuminated
manuscripts, gold chalices, and other treasures from the menace of their own
Dark Ages.
But for now we must go on behaving as if our values have substance. In
New York there is a long tradition of land stewardship, and the decisions
made by the Adirondacks' broad constituency during the last century have
carried this treasure reasonably intact into our own day. There will be new
challenges and decisions just ahead for all Americans as they try to accommodate wild and viable green spaces in their changing society. Primarily because of the Forever Wild clause in their Constitution and a strong land use
planning law, both of them refined by experience, the people of New York
State retain their options.
And that, in the modern world, is no small privilege.
F. GRAHAM, supra note 44, at 277-78.
*
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INTRODUCTION

In The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights,I Michael

J. Perry

examines the legitimacy of constitutional policymaking by the judiciary.
Perry presents a new functional justification for noninterpretive review 2-the practice by which the judiciary has recognized constitutional
guarantees beyond those envisioned by the framers or granted in the
Constitution. Perry seeks to establish that although noninterpretive review lacks constitutional authorization, it fulfills a crucial societal function and is not inconsistent with American society's commitment to
representative democracy. Thus, he asserts, noninterpretive review and
the decisions reached by such review are legitimate.
This Review examines Professor Perry's resolution of the legitimacy
problem. It briefly describes the debate over judicial policymaking 3 and
outlines Perry's theory of noninterpretive review. 4 The Review then
analyzes Perry's dual justification for noninterpretive review 5 and concludes that his argument contains fatal shortcomings.
I
THE PROBLEM

The proper scope of judicial review has been in dispute since the
inception of constitutional adjudication.6 In recent years, the dispute
has heightened as the Supreme Court 7 has announced decisions such as
Roe v. Wade8 that many commentators contend are based not on a historical understanding of the Constitution, but rather on extraneous policy judgments.9 Participants in the debate contest the legitimacy of the
1

M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).

2

Se infra text accompanying note 11.

3

See infra section I.

4

See infra section II.

5

See infra section III.

6

See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see alsoJ. CHOPER, JUDI-

CIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4 (1980) ("Reconciling judicial review with American representative democracy has been the subject of powerful debate since

the early days of the Republic.").
7
This review deals solely with policymaking that resolves issues arising under the federal Constitution, as does Perry's book. See M. PERRY, Supra note 1, at 168 n.18. Thus, the
Review concentrates on the actions of the federal judiciary and, in particular, on the role of
the Supreme Court.

8 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fourteenth amendment due process clause denies states authority
to outlaw abortions in pre-viability period of pregnancy).
9

See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 167 nn.6-8.
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judiciary's constitutional policymaking, specifically, its use of noninterpretive review.
Perry distinguishes noninterpretive from interpretive review by examining the source of the values a court uses to decide a constitutional
question. A court engages in interpretive review when it determines
the constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference to one of the
value judgments of which the Constitution consists-that is, by refer-

ence to a value judgment embodied, though not necessarily explicitly,
either in some particular provision of the text of the Constitution or in
the overall structure of government ordained by the Constitution. 1o
By contrast, a court engages in noninterpretive review when it ascertains
the constitutionality of a policy choice "by reference to a value judgment other than one constitutionalized by the framers."'" The boundary between interpretive and noninterpretive review, as those terms are
defined by Perry, is an elusive one; whether one views a decision as
based on values explicitly or implicitly expressed in the Constitution or
in the governmental structure, or as based solely on those values prevailing among a majority of the Justices, depends largely on one's reading of
the Constitution's text and historical underpinnings.12 To evaluate Professor Perry's theory on its own terms, this Review adopts his restrictive
interpretation of the Constitution's text and the framers' intent.
Perry divides the participants in the legitimacy debate into two
camps: interpretivists and noninterpretivists. According to Perry, interpretivists argue that only interpretive review, and only decisions arrived
at through interpretive review, are legitimate.1 3 Interpretivists hold
that, in reviewing the constitutionality of a given practice, a court
should look beyond the "plain meaning" of the constitutional text 14 to
the value judgments the framers intended to embody in the textual language.t 5 Thus, a court should invalidate a practice if the framers specifically intended to ban it or if it is the modern analogue of a
constitutionally prohibited practice.16 Interpretivism, however, does not
authorize the invalidation of practices that differ in "significant re10

Id at 10.

11

Id. at 11.
But see id. at 19 ("The Supreme Court's actions in virtually none of the important
constitutional cases of the modern period . . . can be explained as exercises of interpretive
review.").
13
See id at 11.
14
Perry distinguishes interpretivism from an even more restrictive theory of constitu12

tional adjudication, literalism. The latter theory holds that courts should base constitutional
decisions solely on the "plain meaning" of express provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 32.
15 Id
16
Id at 32-33. For example, interpretivists would apparently support the application of
fourth amendment standards to modem forms of search and seizure, such as wiretapping and
electronic surveillance. Id
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17
spect[s] from those the framers banned."
In contrast, Perry asserts that noninterpretivists embrace some, 18 if
not all, judicial decisions reached without specific reliance on the constitutional text, the framers' intent, or the governmental structure.' 9
The Supreme Court rarely admits to engaging in noninterpretive
20
review, apparently because it questions the validity of such review.
Scholarly debate over the appropriate form of judicial review has nevertheless proven vigorous and widespread. 2 1 The controversy exists, according to Perry, because many of the Court's modern decisions,
especially in the human rights area, cannot plausibly be explained as the
products of interpretive review. 2 2 If noninterpretive review is illegitimate, all those decisions based on decisional norms not constitutional23
ized by the framers are also illegitimate.

Many theorists contend that the legitimacy question turns on
whether noninterpretive review can be reconciled with American society's commitment to democratic or "electorally accountable" 24 decisionmaking.25 Interpretivists and noninterpretivists take as axiomatic "the
political principle that governmental policymaking . . . ought to be
17
18

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 11; see also infra notes 51-73 and accompanying text (discussing what Perry terms

selective theory of noninterpretivism).
19 See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 11.
20 Id. at 139-40.
21 See, e.g., JudicialReview and the Constitution--The Text and Byond, 8 DAYTON L. REv.
443 (1983); ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theo,7, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981);
JudicialReview versus Democrag, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
22 M. PERRY, supra note I, at 11, 19, 130.
23 Id. at 11. For Perry, who endorses a narrow reading of the Constitution's text and the
framers' intent, the stakes are high. For example, Perry argues that the first amendment was
intended to apply only to the federal government and that the framers of the fourteenth
amendment did not intend to apply the first amendment or any other bill of rights guarantees
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Thus, Perry argues, the cases in which the
Court has reviewed actions of state governments under the first amendment, as applied
through the fourteenth, are products of noninterpretive review. See id. at 61-66. In addition,
Perry argues that the equal protection clause, as originally understood, simply "forbade enactment or enforcement of laws denying on the basis of race any fundamental right granted
residents generally." Id. at 63 (footnote omitted). Perry concurs with Raoul Berger's conclusion that the framers did not intend to constitutionalize the value of equality of the races and
that "segregated public schooling does not offend equal protection as originally understood."
Id at 67. Perry concludes that "[o]ne cannot be a logically consistent interpretivist and accept equal protection doctrine banning, for example, racial segregation." Id. (footnote.
omitted).
24
This Review refers to the principle of democratic decisionmaking as "electorally accountable decisionmaking" or "representative democracy." See id. at 4 ("Because the word
democracy is so freighted and misused, suggestive of vague substantive ideals as well as proceelectorally accountablepoligmaking.") (emphasis in
dural forms,..
I use a different term, ..
original).
25 See, e.g., id. at 2-3, 9-10, 21, 24; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-9, 101-04
(1980); sources cited supra note 21.
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subject to control by persons accountable to the electorate. ' 26 When the
Supreme Court, a politically insulated institution, engages in constitutional polimaking, as opposed to constitutional interpretation,it creates a
27
seemingly irreconcilable conflict with this basic democratic principle.
Interpretivists concede that electorally accountable policymaking is
subject to constitutional constraints. 28 They apparently also concede
that a politically unaccountable judiciary is the only effective means of
implementing these constraints and protecting certain individual rights
against infringement by the majority. They argue, however, that the
constraints should consist only of those that the American people imposed upon themselves through a popular vote to ratify or amend the
Constitution. 29 This somewhat simplistic "civics book" 30 understanding
of the American political system reflects a valid concern that the people
should have ultimate control over the values that govern them. Interpretivists apparently are reluctant to allow the judiciary to enforce
norms that lack a constitutional basis because norms derived from extraconstitutional 3 t sources such as tradition, consensus, or natural law
inevitably vary with the interpreter 32 and cannot be effectively validated or overruled by majority vote.
Proponents of noninterpretive review have responded to the interpretivists' arguments by attempting to show that the framers' original
understanding 33 or the functional needs of the constitutionally mandated structure of government authorize noninterpretive review. 34 In
doing so, the noninterpretivists implicitly concede that noninterpretive
review must be authorized by the text of the Constitution, the governmental structure, or the framers' intent; otherwise, such review is irreconcilable with basic principles of representative democracy. Perry
rejects the possibility of textual, historical, or structural authority for
noninterpretive review and presents a controversial new theory to justify
noninterpretivism.
Perry seeks to justify this extraconstitutional mode of judicial review by establishing that it is the most effective means of serving an
26
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 9; see also J. ELY, supra note 25, at 5, 7 ("We have as a
society from the beginning, and now almost instinctively, accepted the notion that a representative democracy must be our form of government.") (footnote omitted).
27 See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 2-3.
28 See id. at 28.
29 See id.;
J. ELY, supra note 25, at 8.
30 M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 28.
31
"Extraconstitutional" describes that which is "beyond" the values embodied in the
Constitution; "contraconstitutional" describes that which is "against" those values. Id. at IX.
32
See id. at 93-95; J. ELY, supra note 25, at 43-72.
33
See, e.g., Grey, Originsof the Unwritten Constitution: FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionag Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978).
34
See J. ELY, supra note 25; see also infia notes 51-73 and accompanying text (outlining
Ely's theory).
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equally extraconstitutional societal value: the national commitment to
moral evolution or to the possibility that there are right answers to
moral-political issues. Because Perry asserts that the judiciary's political
isolation makes it more competent than Congress to act as the nation's
moral diviner, he does not contend that noninterpretive review is ultimately supportive of representative democracy. Rather, he attempts to
demonstrate that noninterpretive review and the principle of electorally
accountable policymaking are not mutually exclusive by arguing that
Congress's power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts subjects
the federal judiciary to "significant political control. . . at the hands of
'35
electorally accountable officials."
This Review questions the three basic propositions that underlie
Perry's theory: (1) the American public is committed to moral evolution
or at least believes that there are "right answers" to moral-political
problems; (2) the judiciary is best equipped to further this moral reevaluation and growth or to discern morally "right" answers; and (3) Congress's authority to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts 36 provides
the means by which noninterpretive review can be reconciled with the
principle of electorally accountable decisionmaking. Before examining
those propositions, the Review explains the progression of Perry's argument in more detail to illustrate the extreme alternative conclusions
presented to the credulous reader: accepting Perry's justification for
noninterpretive review in all areas of constitutional adjudication or
adopting the narrowest of interpretivist stands.
II
PROFESSOR PERRY'S JUSTIFICATION FOR
NONINTERPRETIVE REVIEW

The implicit initial step in Professor Perry's analysis is to establish
that the practice of noninterpretive review goes beyond value judgments
constitutionalized by the framers not against them-that is, that
noninterpretive review is extraconstitutional, rather than contraconstitutional. 3 7 First, Perry rejects justifications advanced by fellow noninterpretivists, 38 arguing that neither the Constitution's text nor the framers'
original understanding legitimates noninterpretive review. 39 Moreover,
35

36

M. PERRY, supra note I, at 126.

See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 31.
In particular, Perry criticizes Professor Ely's argument that two open-ended constitutional provisions, the ninth amendment and the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, evidence the framers' intent that the people should have rights beyond
those in the Bill of Rights. He therefore rejects Ely's contention that the framers intended the
judiciary to define and enforce constraints not necessarily embodied in specific textual provisions. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 21-24.
39 Id. at 24.
37
38
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after surveying the "equivocal" 40 textual support for interpretive review,
Perry concludes that the framers did not intend to constitutionalize "any.
theogy ofthe properscope offjudicial review, whether narrow, like interpretivism,or
broad."4 I

Perry's treatment of interpretive review illustrates how he bolsters
his argument and intensifies the consequences of rejecting his thesis.
Perry asserts that interpretive review is legitimated by its "compelling
functional justification": 42 the Supreme Court enforces the Constitution
through interpretive review, "completing the framers' vision of the Constitution as supreme law."'43 By adducing a functional justification for
interpretive review, Perry builds an analytical bridge between interpretive and noninterpretive review. If one rejects the notion that a functional rationale can validate a practice not constitutionalized by the
framers," Perry implies that one must then abandon both interpretive
and noninterpretive review.
The second step in Perry's proof that noninterpretive review is extraconstitutional is his assertion that "to say that the framers did not
intend the judiciary to undertake a noninterpretive function is not necessarily to say that the framers intend the judiciary not to undertake
such a function. ' 45 Perry would have the reader believe that the framers neglected to address the issue of judicial review at all in constructing
their delicate system of checks and balances. He therefore feels unconstrained by constitutional considerations and free to pursue other means
of justifying judicial policymaking.
Before presenting the substance of his theory, Perry makes clear the
disastrous consequences of rejecting his functional justification. Perry
raises the stakes of the interpretivist/noninterpretivist debate considerably by subscribing to an extremely narrow reading of the Constitution.
For example, in the equal protection area, Perry endorses Raoul Berger's largely discredited view that the framers' original understanding of
the fourteenth amendment did not intend a "charter for the political
and social equality of [Blacks]." '46 As a result, were the reader to accept
Perry's historical analysis, he would be forced to conclude that "[o]ne
cannot be a logically consistent interpretivist and accept equal protec47
tion doctrine banning, for example, racial segregation.
40
41
42
43
44

tions
45
46

Id. at 14.
Id. a' 74 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
See infra text accompanying notes 91-101 (discussion of necessary and sufficient condito establishing legitimacy of noninterpretive review).
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 20.
See id. at 62-63; see alo R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); supra note

23.
47

M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 67 (footnote omitted). Perry considers the implications of
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To further ensure that a reader sympathetic to the Supreme Court's
recent human rights decision is acutely receptive to his functional theory, Perry attempts to similarly polarize the noninterpretivists' position.
Perry argues that either all noninterpretive review is legitimate or none
of it is.48 He devotes an entire chapter to demonstrating that "no consideration presented by either federalism or separation-of-powers issues
undermines the [interpretivist] claim . . . that all noninterpretive judicial review is illegitimate." '49 Having established that these issues do not
disturb the notion that all noninterpretive review must be treated as a
whole, Perry goes on to attack what he views as the most prominent of
the selective theories of noninterpretivism, John Hart Ely's "representation-reinforcing" 50 approach. 5 1
Ely contends that although some of the Court's decisions, purportedly based on the equal protection clause or the first amendment, are
not supported by values embodied in those provisions, the decisions are
nonetheless legitimate because they further the functioning of representative democracy, a value implicit in the Constitution and in the governmental structure. 52 One might argue, based on Ely's focus on
constitutional values in determining the legitimacy of a particular exercise ofjudicial review, that he is not a noninterpretivist. Perry, however,
ignores this argument and rejects what he views as Ely's selective
noninterpretivist thesis: noninterpretive review is legitimate when applied to "participational53 values such as free speech and equal protection but illegitimate when, as in substantive due process cases, the Court
conducts a substantive review of a legislative policy choice. 54 A brief
exposition of Ely's theory of noninterpretive review is useful as a con-

trast to Perry's holistic approach. In addition, the problems Perry identifies in Ely's theory parallel many of the difficulties in Perry's own

analysis.
Ely contends that noninterpretive review in first amendment and
equal protection cases is "entirely supportive of the American system of
representative democracy" 55 because it removes the obstacles to public
participation in the political process. Judicial policymaking in these areas, he argues, is legitimate on systemic rather than on substantive

grounds. 56 The judiciary must be charged with maintaining the
interpretivism to be even wider than Berger is apparently willing to acknowledge:
Brown [v. Boardof Education] and its progeny ought to be overruled." Id. at 68.
48 Id. at 77, 90.
49 Id. at 6.
50 J. ELY, supra note 25, at 101.
51 M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 77-90, 119-22.
52 J. ELY, supra note 25, at 73-104.
53 M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 77-78 (emphasis in original).
54

Id.

55
56

J. ELY, supra note 25, at 102.
Id at 102-03.
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processes of democratic government (representation-reinforcing) because only the judiciary can objectively assess claims "that either by
clogging the channels of change or by acting as accessories to majority
tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not representing the in'5 7
terests of those whom the system presupposes they are."
Perry criticizes Ely's first amendment argument on alternative
grounds. First, he contests what he claims is Ely's implicit premise: that
there is a consensus among Americans as to "the sort of democratic process that ought to prevail in America."5 8 Perry argues that because
there is no consensus on the optimal nature of speech, publication, and
associational rights, there is no consensus as to democratic processes.

59

Perry alternatively asserts that even if Ely's argument does not presuppose public consensus, it fails because it neglects to justify the judiciary's right to impose its particular ideal of the scope of debatable first
amendment rights and its model of representative democracy on the
political community. Perry asks "by what right does the judiciary substitute its particular conception for the conception of the people's
electorally accountable representatives?" 60 Ely relies on the supposition
that incumbents cannot be trusted to resolve first amendment issues impartially. 6 ' Perry retorts that incumbents will resolve free speech issues
as their constituencies demand. 62 In sum, Perry finds no reason why the
people's choice as to the dimensions of their first amendment rights and
the character of the democratic processes cannot prevail over the Jus63
tices' particular conceptions.
Ely's rationale for terming equal protection a "participational"
value is less intuitive than that forwarded in regard to freedom of expression. In the first amendment area, the judiciary guards the public's
right to speak, publish, and associate, thereby ensuring that the people
are able to participate in the processes by "which values are appropriately identified and accommodated."6 In equal protection cases, the
judiciary supports the democratic processes by ensuring that minorities
are not denied participation in "the accommodation [of values] those
processes have reached. ' 65 Ely recognizes the conceptual conflict between the judiciary's purported role of maintaining democratic
processes and its actual role in equal protection cases of compelling the
majority to behave toward the minority in a way the majority has re57
58

Id.

59
60
61

Id.
Id at 80.
See J. ELY, supra note 25, at 103; M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 81.
See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
J. ELY, supra note 25, at 77; M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 84.
J. ELY, supra note 25, at 77.

62
63
64

65

M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 79 (emphasis in original).
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jected. 66 He attempts to resolve the apparent conflict by use of the concept of "virtual representation." 67 Under this theory, the judiciary
forces public officials to bestow benefits, or refrain from imposing burdens, on minorities with chronically little political power because "as a
practical matter those officials are not electorally accountable to such
'68
[disadvantaged] persons."
Perry again criticizes Ely's model, arguing that the framers did not
constitutionalize the idea of virtual representation, and that no societal
consensus endorses the concept. 69 To Ely's contention that elected representatives cannot be trusted to impartially address equal protection
problems, Perry responds that elected officials will respond to such
problems as their constituencies require. 70 Again, Perry questions why
electorally accountable officials should not be left to resolve equal protection claims within the limits imposed by the fourteenth amendment. 7 1 According to Perry, Ely ultimately relies on the idea that "it is
somehowfairer to have politically disinterested judges resolve equal protection claims of majority tyranny than to have legislators . . .resolve

them. ' 72 To this Perry responds that fairness issues have traditionally
been resolved, and are better resolved, through the political processes.7 3
Perry, like Ely, founds his theory on an assumption that certain
societal needs can be fulfilled only by judicial policymaking. Ely ties his
theory to needs created by values implicit in the constitutionally mandated governmental structure. He argues that some noninterpretive review is necessary for representative democracy to function effectively.
In contrast, Perry founds his theory on extraconstitutional societal needs
that he derives from his personal view of the American psyche.
Perry posits that the American public has a "religious" conception
that "constitute[s] a basic, irreducible feature of the American people's
understanding of themselves"7 4 and that "serves as a source of
unalienated self-understanding. ' 75 Americans, he asserts, feel themselves committed to realize a "'higher law,' "76 to act as "a beacon
to
' 77
the world, an American Israel, especially in regardto human rihis."
The
See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 85.
J. ELY, supra note 25, at 77-88; M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 85.
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 85 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 85-88.
70
Id. at 88.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 88-89 (emphasis in original).
73
Id.at 89 (quoting Sandalow, JudicialProtection of nnorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162,
1177-78 (1977)).
74
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 97.
75
Id.
76
Id.(quoting Bellah, American Civil Religion in the 1970s, ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REV.
Supp. Ser. No. 1, July 1973, at 8).
77
Id.at 98 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
66
67
68
69
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function of noninterpretive review, then, is"prophetic"; the Supreme
Court, in engaging in policymaking in moral-political realms, calls the
government to "provisional judgment" and furthers the "moral evolu78
tion" of the American polity.
Lest such a premise be too mystical for general consumption, Perry
posits an alternative end that requires the use of noninterpretive review.
He contends that as a society, Americans are, or should be, open to "the
possibility that there are right answers to political-moral problems. ' 79 In
this context, noninterpretive review is essential to allow Americans to
"keep faith" 80 with this possibility.
The functional justification for noninterpretive review that Perry
builds upon these assumptions is that, to be true to the American "religious" understanding, one government institution must fulfill the role of
moral prophet. Perry contends that the judiciary, although not infallible, is institutionally better suited to further America's moral evolution
or to divine the "right" answers to moral-political issues:
As a matter of comparative institutional competence, the politically

insulated federal judiciary is more likely, when the human rights issue
is a deeply controversial one, to move us in the direction of a right
answer. . . than is the political process left to its own devices, which
tends to resolve such issues by reflexive, mechanical reference to estab-

lished moral conventions. 8 1
Perry argues that noninterpretive review has evolved to fill a vital function not assumed by legislators for the very reason that legislators are
electorally accountable. Given the assumption that American society is
pledged to moral reevaluation and growth, the judiciary's political immunity makes it the institution most capable of forging beyond the
moral norms of the majority of Americans. Thus, Perry's functional justification for noninterpretive review is premised on the judiciary's electoral unaccountability.
Perry's justification is manifestly at odds with the principle of representative democracy. He argues, however, that the judiciary is subject
to effective political control in the form of Congress's power under article 11182 to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and Congress's ability to control the lower federal courts' original and appellate
jurisdiction.8 3 Perry's idea, only vaguely expressed, is that the Supreme
Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 102.
80 Id at 100.
81
Id. at 102.
82 Under article III, the Supreme Court "shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as the Congress shall
make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.2.
83 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power. . .To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."); see also id art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the
78

79
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Court, the Congress, and the public engage in a discussion that results in
moral growth. The Court speaks through noninterpretive review; Congress and the public can respond through the legislative power to curtail
jurisdiction. Perry explains that:
The relationship between noninterpretive review and electorally accountable policymaking is dialectical. The electorally accountable
political processes generate a policy choice, which typically reflects
some fairly well established moral conventions . .

.

. In exercising

noninterpretive review, the Court evaluates that choice on politicalmoral grounds, in the end either accepting or rejecting it. If the Court
rejects a given policy choice, the political processes must respond,
whether by embracing the Court's decision, by tolerating it, or, if the
decision is not accepted, or accepted fully, by moderating or even by
84
undoing it [through the jurisdiction-limiting power].
Perry would limit Congress, however, to withdrawing the federal
judiciary's jurisdiction over questions resolved by reference to values not
constitutionalized by the framers.8 5 Thus, Congress may control the
Court's noninterpretive policymaking but not its interpretive functions.
Perry also asserts that the Court, in reviewing jurisdiction-limiting legis86
lation, may only exercise its interpretive function.
Perry's critics argue that the jurisdiction-limiting power is ineffective because it generally will be exercised in reaction to a binding decision.8 7 Perry responds that a decision is binding "only where
' 8 the Court

retainsjurisdiction to decidefuture, similar cases in the same way."

He con-

89

cludes that Congress's power is "not a source of perfect control" but it
does "toleraby"'90 reconcile the practice of noninterpretive review with
the principle of electorally accountable decisionmaking.
Perry's aim is to legitimate the Court's practice of noninterpretive
review. To this end, Perry constructs a dual thesis. First, noninterpretive review performs the indispensable function of allowing Americans
"to keep faith (or try to) with our commitment to moral growth-or, if
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
Because this Review concentrates on the proper role of the federal judiciary in reviewing
problems arising under the federal Constitution, see supranote 7, it does not address the problem of how Perry's thesis, which holds that Congress's power to limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts resolves the tension between noninterpretive review and the principle of representative democracy, can legitimate a slate court's policymaking under the federal (or state)
Constitution. For Perry's resolution of this issue, see M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 131-32.
84 M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 112 (footnote omitted).
85 Id.at 128.
86

Id.

87

89

Id at 130.
Id at 131 (emphasis in original).
Id at 138.

90

Id at 126 (emphasis in original).
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you prefer, with the possibility that there are right answers."9 1 Second,
noninterpretive review performs this function in a way that "tolerably
accommodates our other basic, constitutive commitment-our commitment to the
principle of electorall accountablepolicymaking."92 Perry neglects to articulate whether both elements are necessary to validate the Supreme
Court's policymaking. Accordingly, before proceeding with analysis of
Perry's theory, it is necessary to identify the propositions essential to the
legitimacy of noninterpretive review.
It is unclear whether Perry views his functional justification as
either necessary or sufficient to establish the legitimacy of noninterpretive review. At some points he asserts that "[t]he justification for the
practice, if there is one, must be functional. ' 93 However, Perry never
forthrightly addresses the question of whether such an extraconstitutional practice can be legitimated by reference to its extraconstitutional
utility. The question is of some import for, as one commentator has
noted, "[t]he fact that something serves a particular function does not
directly justify it. It may have been a fact that cannibalism provided a
vital protein supplement to the Aztec diet. If so that fact certainly did
not justify the practice. '94 Nothing in the Constitution authorizes
amendment by necessity; where then does Perry find his authority?
Perry apparently believes that the system's functional need for a
practice will legitimate the practice notwithstanding the framers' intent.
He would argue that the Constitution, by necessity, allows for extraconstitutional institutional growth; functionally necessary practices, therefore, are legitimate additions to the framers' scheme. He cites the
"'imperial' presidency" 95 as an example of a practice that goes beyond
the framers' intent but is nonetheless legitimate. 96 One can easily accept
that the Constitution must be open to some organic institutional
growth. Nevertheless, recognition of the federal judiciary's power to
conduct unlimited noninterpretive review constitutes a greater reallocation of constitutional powers and roles than that involved in the development of an "imperial presidency. ' 97 Perry fails to address the
significant problems involved in introducing a power of this enormous
scope into a federal system based on notions of a central government of
limited, enumerated powers.
Taking Perry's argument as a whole, functional considerations are
9'
92
93

94

id. at 125.
Id. at 126 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 24.
O'Fallon, Skepticism and Politics in the Domain of Right, 8 DAYTON L. REv. 713, 715

(1983).
95

M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 114.
Id. It seems incongruous for Perry, who insists on endorsing the narrowest possible
interpretation of the Constitution, to be arguing for flexible construction.
97 See infa text accompanying notes 133-36.
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apparently insufficient in Perry's view to legitimate noninterpretive review. Perry often argues that any justification must allow us "to keep
faith with two of the most basic aspects of our collective self-understanding":98 commitment to moral development andcommitment to the principle of electorally accountable policymaking. Moreover, in framing the
noninterpretivist/interpretivist debate, Perry poses the crucial question
as "whether, given the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, judicial review is legitimate." 99
The final inquiry is whether Perry can legitimate noninterpretive
review soley by establishing its compatibility with representative democracy. Perry's formulation of the legitimacy issue suggests an affirmative
response to this inquiry: "[I]f a principled approach to noninterpretive
review can be developed, one that is consistent with our nation's commitment to representative democracy, . . . the problem of legitimacy

will have been solved."' 0 0 Perry apparently presents his functionaljusti
°
ftcation to demonstrate that noninterpretive review is "salutary. "101
Having established that the practice is beneficial, he proceeds to the
legii'macy question: whether noninterpretivism is consistent with representative democracy.
The final section of this Review examines the components of
Perry's dual justification independently. First, it attempts to demonstrate that Perry's functional justification fails because it involves an unsupportable assumption about the existence of an American "religious"
understanding and a questionable assertion that the judiciary is best
equipped to act as moral diviner. Second, the Review argues that Congress's jurisdiction-limiting power does not remedy the flaws in Perry's
functional theory nor does it independently establish the legitimacy of
noninterpretive review.
III
ANALYSIS

A.

The Functional Justification for Judicial Policymaking

Perry constructs his functional justification on the alternative
premises that the American people are committed to moral evolution or
at least recognize that discoverable "right"' 0 2 answers to moral-political
issues exist. The latter premise is simply a more palatable restatement of
the former. One may readily accept the notion that the American peo98
99
100
101
102

M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 101.
Id at 9.
Id at 24; see also id. at 9-10.
Id at 125.
Professor Perry conducts his discussion on the implicit understanding that the people

are making "principled" moral choices. He does not recognize that compromises may result
in "the best possible" choice or a solution necessitated by practical or political considerations.
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pie believe right answers to moral issues exist. In fact, they probably
believe that their own resolution of a moral issue is the "right" one. If
this is the case, they have no need and little tolerance for Supreme Court
prophecy. Thus, Perry's functional theory works only if his assertion
that the American people are open to the possibility of "right" answers
means that they believe that "[t]he moral sensibilities of the pluralistic
American polity typically lag behind, and are more fragmented than,
the developing insights of moral philosophy and theology,"' 0 3 and that
the people are therefore devoted to the search for right answers. In sum,
the single premise underlying Perry's functional approach is that the
American people recognize that there are right answers that they have
not yet found, but will strive to discover.
Perry refuses to argue with those who believe that there are no right
answers to moral-political questions ("metaethical relativists") or those
who contend that even if right answers exist, there is no way to conclusively discern them ("ethical skeptics"). 10 4 To be fair, there seems no
effective method to "prove" that discoverable right answers exist short
of a dissertation on moral philosophy, a task for which Perry is concededly' 0 5 ill-equipped. Perry mistakenly concludes, however, that
[i]f Bork's and Rehnquist's moral skepticism were widely shared,
it would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to elaborate a justification for noninterpretive review that would have much currency.
For the moral skeptic who ir committed to the principle ofelectorally account-

able policymaking, there is no principled reason to prefer an answer
given by the Court to one given by an institution that, unlike the
Court, is electorally accountable. No answer is demonstrably correct,
and, therefore, better an answer by an electorally accountable institution than by an electorally unaccountable one.' 0 6
Perry fails to see that the truth of the assertion that there are discoverable right answers is irrelevant to his theory. One must believe
that right answers can be found to personally endorse noninterpretivism.10 7 But to concede the legitimac of noninterpretive review, assuming
that Perry's functional justification is valid, one need only believe that
the American public perceives that there are discoverable right answers,
whether or not that perception is well-founded. To illustrate, assume
with Perry that a functional justification built upon an extraconstitutional
societal need can legitimate a practice not contemplated by the fram103
104
105
106
107

M. PERRY,
Id. at 103.

supra note

1, at 118.

See id. at 110.

Id. at 105 (emphasis in original).
For the principled ethical skeptic committed to representative democracy, "'[w]here
constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled
way to prefer any claimed human value to any other,"' id.(quoting Bork), and judgments
made by elected policymakers must always prevail.
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ers. t08 Assume also that Perry establishes the functional necessity of
noninterpretive review and reconciles it with the principle of representative democracy. Finally, accept Perry's premise regarding the American
public's commitment to moral growth. Ethical skeptics would still view
the product of noninterpretive review as morally arbitrary, but they
would be forced to concede its legitimacy, just as they concede the legitimacy of morally arbitrary legislative enactments because the people
have a fundamental commitment to representative democracy. Thus,
Perry need only establish as a necessary (but not sufficient) 109 condition
to legitimacy that the public's commitment to moral evolution is as fundamental as its commitment to representative democracy.
Perry, however, makes no attempt to support his supposition regarding the American "religious" understanding. He is therefore guilty
of the offense with which he charges Ely: employing an unsupported
assumption of consensus as the basis for his analysis. 110 If one rejects the
notion that American society is committed to moral evolution, the remainder of Perry's "functional" analysis becomes superfluous. This critique of Perry's functional justification of noninterpretive review
therefore assumes that the American public aspires to moral growth.
Perry builds his functional theory on his premise regarding the
American "religious" understanding. Simply stated, he believes that
some governmental institution must assume the task of "regularly
deal[ing] with fundamental political-moral problems other than by
mechanical reference to established moral conventions," 1 1 and that the
judiciary is best equipped to do so. Upon examination, Perry's justification raises two fundamental questions. First, should any governmental
entity, particularly one that is politically isolated, voluntarily assume
the role of moral diviner? Second, is the judiciary an effective instrument for promoting moral growth and, if so, is it more effective than
Congress in achieving this end?
Perry, apparently entirely comfortable with the idea that a governmental institution should take upon itself the role of moral prophet, does
not even address the first question. Perry's failure to consider the propriety of this prophetic role is consistent with his view that the American
"religious" conception is "a basic, irreducible feature of the American
people's understanding of themselves."' 12 Perry implies that, as one of
the public's deepest concerns, moral development should be pursued in
108

See supra text accompanying notes 91-101 (discussing necessary and sufficient condi-

tions for legitimacy).
109 Perry must also establish that noninterpretive review serves the American commitment to moral growth better than other mechanisms and that noninterpretivism can be reconciled with the principle of representative democracy.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 58-59, 69 (discussing Ely's theory).
111 M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 101 (emphasis in original).
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the manner most likely to involve the conscience of the entire nationthrough the political processes. In addition, Perry's definition of "political-moral" issues encompasses almost any issue worthy of public debate.13 The government must necessarily confront issues such as
"distributive justice and the role of government, freedom of political dis114
sent, racism and sexism, the death penalty, [and] human sexuality."
Perry's conclusion that some governmental agency must assume a prophetic role thus is entirely consistent with his assumption that the public
wants "right," not necessarily popular, answers to these issues.
The second issue raised by Perry's functional justification is the accuracy of his conclusion that the judiciary is the governmental institution best qualified to act as moral pathfinder. To support this
conclusion, Perry relies exclusively on the idea that legislators' electoral
accountability binds them to prevailing societal norms. 115 He credits
the politically insulated judiciary" 6 with the institutional capacity to
resolve controversial issues by reference to progressive values. Perry neglects to consider, however, that the judiciary has characteristics other
than electoral unaccountability that may frustrate its ability to act as
prophet. The most obvious such characteristic is the judiciary's traditional vision of itself as an enforcer, not a creator, of law. Judges' own
perceptions of their role may make them unwilling to forge a new political morality. Many judges may feel compelled to exercise restraint, follow precedent, defer to legislative judgments, and submerge their
117
personal predilections to the values of the community.
A related consideration in assessing the judiciary's capacity to promote moral growth is the public's perception of the judicial role., If the
public is unaware that courts are engaging in constitutional policymaking, not interpretation, they are likely to simply accept the decision as
law, whether or not they agree with the moral judgment underlying it.
Thus the public's perception of the Supreme Court as constitutional interpreter may foreclose the possibility of a dialectical growth process initiated by the Court's noninterpretive review and informed by public
participation.
Set, e.g., text accompanying note 114.
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 100.
115
See, e.g., supra quotation accompanying note 81.
116
Perry's reliance on the judiciary's political unaccountability may seem inconsistent
with his assertion that Congress's jurisdiction-limiting power subjects the judiciary to effective
political control. One can resolve this apparent contradiction, however, by referring to
Perry's dialectical theory. Individual judges' electoral unaccountability allows them to instigate moral reevaluation by continuously deciding cases according to their advanced moral
vision. Their judgments are theoretically subject to correction by the public through the
agency of Congress, but they may continue to spur the nation's conscience unimpeded by
incumbency concerns.
117 See, e.g., Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Foreword ContilutionalAdjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 94 (1966).
113
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Even if the public is aware that the Court is acting extraconstitutionally, it is debatable whether the Court's resolution of issues encourages moral growth. Commentators argue, for example, that the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, "8 one of the few decisions that has been widely
denounced as illegitimate, 19 extinguished the dialectic that Perry seeks
to promote. 120 They contend that Roe effectively ended legislative and
societal reevaluation of the abortion issue and polarized the debate, thus
12 1
terminating the process of compromise and moral growth.
Assuming the judiciary would candidly undertake a prophetic role
and the public would respond to noninterpretive decisions as it does to
legislative policy choices, Perry still must establish that the judiciary is
better equipped to initiate moral growth than the legislature. Perry concedes that the judiciary is fallible and that "[i]f the Court can serve as an
instrument of moral growth, it can also serve as an instrument of moral
retardation."' 2 2 But, he argues, the proper question to ask is whether
"noninterpretive review has served a salutary, perhaps crucial governmental (policymaking) function during the modem period."' 23 In assessing
the judiciary's contribution to moral growth, one can certainly treat
Lochner v. New York 124 and DredScott v. Sanford125 as aberrations and look

in the more recent past to Brown or Roe as examples of morally progressive decisions. Perry fails to explain, however, why the Court will continue to make "progressive" value choices, that is, choices consistent
with Perry's liberal philosophy, and escape the misjudgments of past
Courts. The question remains whether individual judges are made
privy to a source of advanced values by virtue of their office.
In determining the source of extraconstitutional values to which
judges should look in deciding human rights cases, Perry rejects "tradition" and "consensus" as insufficiently determinant. 126 Nor does he
contend that there exists "a single authoritative moral system that
should inform the exercise of noninterpretive review."' 127 Rather,
"right" answers can be found, according to Perry, at "a point at which a
variety of philosophical and religious systems of moral thought and belief
converge."' 28 Perry ultimately concedes, however, that, rather than
scouring major moral theories for points of convergence, "each justice
118
119
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 1 n.6.
See, e.g., Maltz, Murder in the Cathedral--theSupreme Court asMoralProphet, 8 DAYTON L.
623, 631 (1983).
See id.
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 115.
Id at 116 (emphasis added).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60 U.S. (90 How.) 393 (1857).
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[inevitably] will deal with human rights problems in terms of the particular political-moral criteria that are, in that justice's view, authoritative."' 129 At this point, Perry's theory invites the same challenge Perry
directs at Ely's analysis: why should the American public prefer the
views of individual judges to their own, or to those of their elected
officials? 130
Even if the judge's office allows him the freedom to choose an unpopular policy, the question remains whether he will use that freedom
in a morally progressive way. If judges may decide extraconstitutional
issues by reference to their own "moral vision,"' 13 the "right" answers
flowing from noninterpretive review are, as the ethical skeptics contend,
just "a matter of taste"' 32 unless even morally regressive decisions further
moral development. One can salvage Perry's functional theory, by arguing that the Court, in issuing "different" policy choices, acts as a catalyst for a moral dialogue. Thus, the legitimacy of noninterpretive
review under Perry's functional theory turns on the existence of a true
dialectic. There must be a meaningful way in which Congress and the
public can respond to the judge's individual value choices so that
through a moral dialogue, the "right" answer can be forged. Perry asserts that Congress's jurisdiction-limiting power constitutes the mechanism by which this dialogue is effected.
B.

Congress's Jurisdiction-Limiting Power
Perry's contention that Congress's jurisdiction-limiting power sub-

jects the judiciary to "significant political control . . .at the hands of

electorally accountable officials"' 3 3 is the most crucial component of his
argument. Perry's functional justification is valid only if he can establish that this power promotes a dialectical process of moral reevaluation
and growth. Even if his functional theory fails, Perry may be able to
legitimate noninterpretivism, based on the accommodation effected by
the jurisdiction-limiting power between the practice of noninterpretive
134
review and the principle of representative democracy.
Although Perry's interpretation of the jurisdiction-limiting power is
crucial to the success of his argument, it is one of the weakest parts of his
analysis. One senses that Perry's resort to the jurisdiction-limiting
power is not a sincere attempt to identify a bona fide check on judicial
policymaking. Perry p-esents an anti-majoritarian (in his terms, "dialectical") justification for noninterpretive review but needs a credible,
129
130

Id. at 111.
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See supra text accompanying notes 60-62, 70-72 (discussion of Ely's theory).

Id. at 103.
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yet not too effective, means of reconciling noninterpretivism with representative democracy. He virtually concedes that such a motive underlies his reliance on the jurisdiction-limiting power, stating:
I am not happy conceding such a broad jurisdiction-limiting power to
Congress. . . . Perhaps I have overlooked something. Perhaps it is
possible to justify noninterpretive review in a way that takes seriously
the principle of electorally accountable policymaking but that does
not concede a broad jurisdiction-limiting power to Congress. I invite
135
anyone interested in elaborating such a justification to try to do so.
Perry's grudging acceptance of the jurisdiction-limiting power, and his
professed willingness to withdraw his reconciliation at the sign of another, narrower theory of control indicates that he is not truly seeking an
effective means of making the Supreme Court politically accountable.
Perry's distaste for meaningful public control over the Court's
noninterpretive function is best illustrated by examining the flaws of his
jurisdiction-limiting theory. Perry's vision of Congress's jurisdictionlimiting power as a constraint on judicial policymaking is objectionable
on two counts. First, on a "functional" level, the jurisdiction-limiting
power fails to provide an effective check on the Court's extraconstitutional activities. Second, the jurisdiction-limiting power subjects fundamental "constitutional" rights to majority ratification or veto. This, in
turn, diminishes the symbolic power of the Constitution and the public
perception, if not the reality, of the relation between the Court, Congress, and the people.
On a theoretical level, Congress's jurisdiction-limiting power may
satisfy the felt need to subject the Court to some kind of political accountability. In practice, however, this power has not proved an effective source of control. Although Congress has considered many
proposals, 136 only once has it exercised its jurisdiction-limiting power to
prevent the Supreme Court from acting. 137 In contrast, constitutional
amendments have overruled the Court four times. 138 Thus, the amendment process, a source of control that Perry rejects as ineffective, 139 has
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 137.
For a list of proposals, see J. CHOPER, supra note 6, at 446 n.56; Sager, Foreword- ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Aulhority to Regulate theJurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 17, 18 n.3 (1981).
137
See Ex park McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (habeas corpus jurisdiction). As
Maltz notes, "[e]ven in that case, the effect of the imposition of the limitation was only to,
delay the exercise ofjudicial authority." Maltz, supra note 120, at 629 (citing Exparte Yerger,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) in support of this proposition).
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (overruled in part by the twenty-sixth
138
amendment); Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (overruled by the
sixteenth amendment); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (overruled by the
fourteenth amendment); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (overruled by the
eleventh amendment); see also Maltz, supra note 120, at 629.
See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 127.
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injected a relatively greater degree of accountability into the judicial
review process. Moreover, even if one were to found a theory of control
on the combined mechanisms of jurisdiction-limiting and amendment,
one could not seriously suggest that five cases in over two hundred years
demonstrate "significant political control"' 140 or even the existence of a
meaningful dialogue between the Court and the public.
Perry's response to this argument further illustrates that his jurisdiction-limiting theory is a makeweight. First, Perry claims that congressional reticence in using the jurisdiction-limiting power stems from
the fact that many congressmen secretly endorse the Court's controversial human rights decisions but, for political reasons, would not endorse
similar legislative solutions. 4 1 Even if this claim were true, Perry
should not rely on it to explain congressional behavior. Such a claim is
counter to his assertion that public input, through the agency of Congress's jurisdiction-limiting power, furthers the Court-initiated dialectical process of moral growth. If the legislators choose not to listen to
their constituents, as Perry implies, the conduit for public discussion
closes and the moral dialogue ends. In addition, Perry fails to recognize
that some legislators who disagree with the Court's policy choices or
who would feel bound to register their constituencies' disapproval are
reluctant to take action because they view the Court's directives as
supreme law.
Perry does recognize that Congress's failure to exercise its jurisdiction-limiting power in the last hundred years may be due to "legislative
inertia."1 42 He applauds this phenomenon, however, as a necessary
check on impulsive political behavior: "If it were relatively easy to enact a jurisdiction-limiting proposal, the temptation to do so frequently
and unreflectively would likely prove irresistible to legislators willing,
indeed eager, to bend to prevailing if momentary passions in order to
preserve their incumbency."' 143 Perry apparently believes that the judiciary alone has the capacity to make principled judgments in pursuit of
a moral vision. Although Perry concedes that "the opposition of even a
significant minority of the Senate or House can, as a practical matter,
doom [jurisdiction-limiting] proposals," he denies that "the burden of
legislative inertia prevents Congress's jurisdiction-limiting power from
serving as a source of significant political control over noninterpretive
review."' 144 In Perry's mind, "significant" control is synonymous with
"potential" control. Potential control, however, may well be insufficient
not only to satisfy those who adhere to the principle of electorally ac126.
134.
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countable decisionmaking, but to also allow any meaningful dialogue
between the Court and the public.
Another practical difficulty with Perry's analysis of the jurisdictionlimiting power is his distinction between Congress's power to curtail the
Court's noninterpretive jurisdiction and its inability to control the
Court's interpretive function. It is worth noting that Perry's restrictive
view of Congress's power to define the Court's appellate jurisdiction differs from the "orthodox view," 1 45 which holds that this power is plenary. 46 In support of his view, Perry simply points out that even
interpretivists recognize the legitimacy of interpretive review and admit
that the principle of electorally accountable decisionmaking is not absolute. Thus, "it is unnecessary for the noninterpretivists (or anyone else)
to concede to Congress power to control interpretive review."' 14 7 Even if
Perry were to advance a more compelling textual or historical basis for
his view, however, there remain significant practical difficulties in distinguishing between interpretive and noninterpretive review for the purposes of restricting the Court's jurisdiction or reviewing such restrictions.
Commentators differ greatly over what rights are "implicit" in the Constitution; their dispute demonstrates the inherent difficulties in drawing
the interpretive/noninterpretive distinction. One's definition of what
constitutes a noninterpretivist decision depends on one's historical predilection. 148 Moreover, the Supreme Court rarely acknowledges that it
engages in noninterpretive review.' 49 Thus, it is doubtful that Congress,
in exercising its jurisdiction-limiting power, will be able to find a clear
line between decisions based on values explicit or implicit in the Constitution and those decisions based on extraconstitutional values. The
Court will have similar difficulties in exercising review over jurisdictionlimiting enactments.
Perry implicitly denies the existence of these line drawing problems
with the assertion that "in very few consequential human rights cases of
the modern period can the Court's decisions evenplausibly be explained as
products of interpretive review." 5 0 One must regard Perry's estimate of
145
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Id.; see also Ex parle McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Other commentators
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note 145, at 35 & n.10.
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the plausibility of deriving these decisions from the values embodied in
the Constitution with some skepticism, however, because of his extremely narrow reading of the Constitution's text and historical underpinnings. 15' Indeed, Perry begs the question by saying that, in his
judgment, interpretivist explanations of the modern human rights cases
are incorrect and that, if one accepts his theory, one encounters no linedrawing difficulties. The fact remains that others do not share his views
and, thus, Congress's and the Court's task in differentiating between interpretive and noninterpretive decisions will not be easy.
Perry also counters objections to the practical problems inherent in
his jurisdiction-limiting theory by advocating that the Supreme Court
candidly acknowledge when it engages in noninterpretive review. 152 To
date, however, the Court has consistently avoided doing so and is unlikely to become more forthright in the future. Moreover, the Court's
public recognition that a given decision represents constitutional legislation would exacerbate the final flaw in Perry's jurisdiction-limiting theory: its reallocation of power among the Court, Congress, and the
people without constitutional authorization.
The Court's recent human rights decisions have primarily involved
individuals' "constitutional" 153 rights against the majority. Perry would
countenance a congressional veto over what the Court has pronounced
to be fundamental rights of the American people. In effect, "[n]o longer
could rights be thought of as something we have independent of majority will . . . . [T]he fact is that [control over jurisdiction] would leave
us only those rights that no determined majority could be mustered to
oppose." 154 The probability of congressional action to effectively overrule the right to privacy, for example, is remote. Nevertheless, the fact
that the majority could do so illustrates the way in which Perry's theory
would radically alter the perception, if not the reality, of constitutionally mandated roles.
Under Perry's theory, the Court would candidly 5 5 acknowledge
that a decision effectively amended the Constitution by adding to its
guarantees. 156 Congress, if it chose to exercise its jurisdiction-limiting
power, could veto the proposed amendment by silencing the Court. If
Congress could not overcome its traditional lethargy, the deciSee supra note 23.
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 139-45.
153 That is, rights the Court claims are derived from the Constitution, regardless of commentators' contentions that the rights are not based on values constitutionalized by the
framers.
154 O'Fallon, supra note 94, at 720.
155 See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 139-41 (discussing need for candor).
156 Perry has his own "ratchet theory." He argues that the Court may not make deci151
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sion/amendment would be treated as constitutional law, subject to subsequent overruling by Congress or the Court. Such fundamental
reordering of traditional roles requires public endorsement in the form
of a constitutional amendment. Perry, however, has attempted to legitimate this reallocation of roles through a functional justification, apparently obviating the need for popular ratification. In structuring his
analysis of noninterpretive review, Perry has highlighted the true character of the Court's actions in recent human rights decisions and the
gradual shift in roles that has come about. Perry ultimately has done
the Court a great disservice by advancing a fatally flawed theory of legitimacy which, at the same time, throws into sharp relief the constitutional illegitimacy of the role restructuring that has evolved.
CONCLUSION

The virtue of Perry's theory of judicial review lies in its fundamentally candid approach to the noninterpretivist/interpretivist debate.
Perry does not strain the constitutional text or fabricate an intent on the
part of the framers to legitimate noninterpretive review. He feels that
although the Supreme Court may occasionally err, it has assumed a crucial role in furthering human rights, a role no other branch of government is willing or able to undertake. Through an elaborate analytical
scheme, Perry essentially admits that he endorses noninterpretive review
as a means to attain necessary ends.
Perry's principle fault is his failure to adequately address the
problems his justification raises or to sufficiently support his positions.
After rebutting all other justifications for noninterpretivism, Perry advances a less than compelling argument for his own theory. Thus, although he may be honest, he is ineffective. The credible reader may
intuitively agree with Perry and sympathize with the result he seeks.
Such a reader may nevertheless conclude that the only tenable position
in the constitutional system to which we are committed is reluctant interpretivism.
Julie R. O'Sullivan

